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I. Introduction
The unpaid employee is a common phenomenon in employment
law, and one which poses difficult problems of determining the
available rights and remedies. Take Jean, for example, who works
full-time in an office for Bill. By virtue of her employment contract,
Jean earns a fixed salary at an hourly rate. Moreover, provincial
statutes entitle her to vacation pay and holiday pay. Bill falls one
month in arrears in paying Jean's wages, because his business is
financially unstable. This adds a new dimension to the employment
relationship: Jean is not only an employee, but also a creditor of Bill
for wages owing. How can Jean collect this debt if Bill is unwilling
to pay, or incapable of paying? Suppose that Bill owes other debts,
for example, to the city for taxes, to a finance company for a
short-term loan, to a manufacturer for an equipment lease, and to a
car dealer for a conditional sale agreement. How will Jean's claim
for wages fare against these competing creditors?
This paper deals with the enforcement of an employee's right to
payment of wages, with particular attention to the statutory lien as a
technique of wage protection. In Part II alternative remedies
available to the unpaid employee are critically reviewed, with
emphasis on the present state of wage protection in Nova Scotia.
Part III focuses on the statutory lien created by s. 5A of the British
Columbia Payment of Wages Act 1 , in the context of a recent
Supreme Court of Canada decision interpreting that section, and in
Part IV the B.C. statutory lien is compared with the lien created by
the Nova Scotia Labour Standards Code, 2 considering the
implications for Nova Scotia's wage protection. Part V concludes
the paper with recommendations for more effective wage
protection.
*LL.B. 1980, Dalhousie Law School. This article is based on a paper written for a
seminar in Employment Law at Dalhousie in 1979.
1. S.B.C. 1962, c. 45,s. 5A, as amended by S.B.C. 1970, c. 35, ss. 7,8; 1973, c.
68,s.7.
2. S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, as amended by S.M.S. 1974, c. 29; 1975, c. 50; 1976, c.
41; 1977, c. 18; 1977, c. 68.
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At the outset of this discussion, it is essential to define the terms
which recur throughout. The definitions of the Labour Standards
Code (LSC) will be adopted as a point of departure, and modified
where necessary.
"Employee" has been defined as "a person employed to do
work" (s. 1(d)). For the purposes of this paper, the term excludes
independent contractors,3 and refers exclusively to non-unionized
employees. "Wages" means "salaries, commissions and compensation in any form for work or services measured by time, piece or
otherwise. . ." (s. 1-(r) ). It includes minimum wages, pay in lieu
of notice, vacation pay, compensation for holidays with pay, and
overtime,4 but excludes compensation for breach of contract.
Finally, "wage protection" means "protection of the employee's
right to receive the wages he has earned." 5
On first consideration, wage protection appears to be primarily
concerned with the relationship between employer and employee,
and the contractual obligation of the employer to pay the employee
for services rendered. To a limited extent, legislation has extended
this obligation by involving third parties (such as directors of some
corporations) in the responsibility to pay unpaid wages. However,
the status of the unpaid employee in relation to the employer's other
creditors is essential to the matter of wage protection. This aspect of
wage protection will hereafter be called "priority".
The wage-earner is particularly vulnerable as a creditor of his
employer for the following reasons:
(1) An individual employee is in a weak bargaining position,
3. InRe Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Amm et al. (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 369
(Ont. Div. Ct.), Hughes J. suggests that the all-encompassing defintion of
"employee" now obviates the need for a distinction between "independent
contractor" and "employee". However, this point remains controversial, and is
beyond the realm of this study.
4. Note that the Labour Standards Code excludes vacation pay from "wages", but
includes it in the term "unpaid pay". For the purpose of simplicity, the two terms
have been combined herein, arriving at the enlarged concept of "unpaid wages".
Confusion may arise from the LSC definitions of "pay" and "wages". For
-xample, by interpreting s. 84 as implementing "protection of pay" through a s. 77
complaint and a s.24 order, it could apply to vacation pay as well as to other wages
owed.
While acknowledging the difficulties of the potential over-lap between sections 34
and 84 of the LSC, this writer wishes to avoid such problems herein.
5. Owen Gray, Wage Protection (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1973), at p. ii. The
:enn is not defined in the Nova Scotia LSC.
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stemming from the nature of the employer-employee relationship.
The wage debt is not the only object of their relationship, unlike the
situation with other business and consumer creditors. Because of his
employer's general role of authority and his right of summary
dismissal for certain breaches of duty an employee may be
intimidated and afraid to assert his right as creditor.
(2) Business and consumer creditors are in a relatively strong
bargaining position. "Good business creditors, particularly moneylenders, are harder to find than employees; if it comes to a choice,
an employer may be more inclined to satisfy those creditors than to
6
pay his employees."
(3) There is a marked difference in the economic strength of
wage creditors and business creditors. Many employees rely on
wages as their only source of income. Non-payment for any length
of time can be financially debilitating. An unpaid wage-earner is an
involuntary creditor with no profit motive, whereas business
creditors voluntarily extend credit in order to make a profit through
interest charges. In other words, time usually works against
employees, but in favour of other creditors.
(4) Employees are not in a position to assess the financial
situation of their employers. Business creditors, on the other hand,
can demand information relevant to the nature of the risk posed by a
particular transaction, and have the expertise to assess such risk. It
is essential that a creditor register his claim prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy, because proceedings against a debtor or his property
are stayed when the debtor becomes bankrupt. But without adequate
information, unpaid employees are unable to do so. Here again the
time factor is critical to wage collection.
(5) Without financial resources to hire a lawyer and pay the cost
of legal action, employees are unaware of their rights as creditors
and incapable of taking advantage of them. Frequently, the only
practical remedy available to an employee is quitting and seeking a
job with a reliable employer.
In general, unpaid employees cannot meaningfully compete with
their employer's business and consumer creditors. In order to
compensate for this vulnerability, wage creditors need fast and
inexpensive legal remedies aginst employers, and priority in
payment over other creditors. 7 Federal and provincial governments
6. Id., at 118
7. A forceful analogy may be drawn between the position of wage creditors, and
that of consumers. Legislators now perceive consumers as an economic class
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have acknowledged the need for wage protection, and are at
different stages in legislating solutions.
II. Alternative Methods of Wage Protection
(1)Civil Action
Wages owing can be recovered as a debt by an individual
employee in a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The Municipal
Courts Act 8 of Nova Scotia, s. 8(1)(a), confers jurisdiction on the
Municipal Court over "any claim of debt or on contract in which the
amount sought to be recovered does not exceed five hundred
dollars.. ." The County Court has jurisdiction over claims of up to
$50,000. 9
The major drawback with civil actions is their cost - in time and
money - to plaintiff employees. While time is of the essence to the
employee who relies on his pay-cheque to meet daily expenses, the
processes of getting to trial and executing a court order are
time-consuming. Depending on the size of the debt owed, lawyers'
fees may be more than the amount of wages recovered.
(2) Masterand Servants Acts
Master and Servant Acts provide a faster method of recovering up
to a specified limit of wages owed - generally a maximum of
$500. or six month's wages. Commonly under these acts, after an
employee swears a complaint before a justice of the peace or
magistrate, the latter is empowered to issue a summons to the
employer or, where appropriate, a warrant for his arrest. If the
matter is determined in the employee's favour, an order for payment
is filed, and enforced as an order of the court. 10 There are Master
and Servant Acts in all provinces except New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, and Prince Edward Island.
(3) Prosecution
The Labour Standards Code of Nova Scotia makes non-payment
of wages a summary offence, with a penalty of not more than $100.
and, on default of payment, maximum fifty days' imprisonment (s.
89). Non-payment of vacation pay is also a summary offence,
requiring special compensation for their lack of bargaining power. Thus, a network
of consumer protection legislation is being developed to that end.
8. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 197
9. County Court Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 64, s. 27(a), as amended by S.N.S. 1968,
c. 41, s. 7
10. For example, Master andServant Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 263, ss. 1-5
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punishable by a fine of up to $500. and, in default, by imprisonment
for between ten and ninety days (s. 92).
While the legislation of other provinces provides for a judicial
order to pay wages due at the time of conviction, 1 the LSC is silent
on the matter. However, such a remedy is available in Nova Scotia
by a circuitous route. The Summary Proceedings Act,' 2 s. 5(I),
states that the Criminal Code, 13 Part XXIV, is applicable to
summary convictions under provincial enactments. Within Part
XXIV, s. 722 provides for the imposition of a maximum fine on
summary conviction, and subsection 11 defines "fine" to include
"a pecuniary penalty or other sum of money". 14 Arguably, "fine"
would include wages due.
A further uncertainty under the Nova Scotian statute is whether
individual employees may prosecute. S.88(1), requiring the written
consent of the Minister of Labour to institute criminal proceedings,
may have been intended to discourage such initiatives by private
individuals.
The CanadaLabour Code, 5 s. 69, creates a summary offence
for non-payment of wages to federal employees. Section 71
provides for the convicting court to order payment of wage arrears,
compensation for loss of employment to the date of conviction, and
reinstatement.
Joining wage collection with criminal prosecution reduces the
need for an employee to bring two separate actions. However,
problems are created by wage recovery through prosecution. Such
joinder of actions raises the burden of proof of non-payment from
the usual civil standard to "beyond a reasonable doubt.' 6 In
addition, an order for payment of arrears is futile if the employer is
insolvent. Finally, in jurisdictions such as Nova Scotia, where
prosecution requires the Minister's consent, the availability of a
remedy may depend on a political decision by the Minister of
Labour on whether to prosecute.
(4) Collection by Public Officials
Most provinces - British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia,
11. Supra, note 5, at 28
12. S.N.S. 1972, c. 18, s. 5(1)
13. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34
14. Thanks to Prof. B. Cotter of the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, for his
enlightenment on this point.
15. R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1
16. Supra, note 5, at 40
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Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan 17 - have
established public bodies to investigate and settle instances of wage
non-payment. In Nova Scotia, the Director of Labour Standards and
the Labour Standards Tribunal are responsible for wage protection.
By s.75(1) of the LSC, an employer is obliged to pay his employees
at least twice a month, within five working days after each pay
period expires. If thxe employer a s to do so, an empoyee may
complain to the Director within six months of the breach of duty (s.
77). The Director investigates the complaint and tries to settle it (s.
19(1)). If his attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and he decides
that the complaint is justified, the Director orders the employer to
pay to the Tribunal the wages owing (s. 19(3)). Both the employee
and the employer have the right to appeal to the Tribunal within ten
days after the order is served (s. 19(5)). The Tribunal issues a
written order under s.24, which may be appealed to the Appeal
Division of the Supreme Court on a question of law or jurisdiction,
within thirty days (s. 18(2)).
The LSC confers broad power and procedural discretion on the
Director. He is not required to serve notice or hold hearings before
making an order (s. 19(8)). If no appeal is filed to the Tribunal (s.
19(5)), an order of the Director or the Tribunal may be entered with
the Prothonotary and enforced as an order of the Surpreme Court
(s.86(2)). This includes enforcement by means of attachment order,
execution order and contempt order.
Collection by public officials is advantageous over action by
individual employees. It is less expensive to the employee,
speedier, and more informal than courtroom proceedings. The
employee is benefitted by the expertise of the Labour Standards
Branch, particularly if he is represented by the Director on an appeal
to the Tribunal. Moreover, the Code provides enforcement
measures not available to an employee under other statutes.' 8 The
question of who is acting - the employee or a public official - is a
continuing dichotomy, and should be kept in mind throughout this
section on alternatives of wage protection.
(5) Liability of Strangers to the Employment Contract
Legislation has altered the law of privity of contract by creating
17. Payment of Wages Act, S.B.C. 1962, c. 45; Payment of Wages Act, S.M.
1975, c. 21.; Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10; Employment Standards
Act, S.O. 1974, c. 112; Labour Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. L-1; Labour Standards
Act, 1977, S.S. 1976-77, c. 36
18. Such measures will be discussed later in this part of the paper.
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several situations of direct third-party liability for wage payment. 19
(a) Personal liability of directors of a corporation is coming into
increasing use. Generally, corporation statutes imposing such
measures make directors jointly and severally liable for unpaid
wages of up to six months. They require an employee to have first
sued the corporation within a certain time limit, and had the writ of
execution returned unsatisfied. Directors can only be sued while
they are still acting as directors, or within a specified period
thereafter. 20 Some acts make express provision for claims in case of
insolvency of a corporation, eliminating the requirement to have
sued the corporation beforehand.
The only such legislation in effect in Nova Scotia is the Loan
Companies Act, 2 1 the Trust Companies Act 22 and the Canada
Business CorporationsAct. 23 There is, as yet, no general provision
in the LSC imposing personal liability on all company directors.
Director liability is a practical measure because directors are in a
position to be aware of the financial status of the corporation and to
insure wage payment. It provides incentive to more careful financial
management of corporations. Further, it eliminates the occasional
problem of piercing the corporate veil to identify the offending
employer. Its most serious shortcomings are related to time. It may
sometimes be impossible to meet the stipulated time limitations in
order to sue a director, particularly while the director retains that
position with the company. In addition, there is an extended period
of time involved in the overall process before an employee actually
collects his debt.
(b) The Nova Scotia Labour Standards Code, s.81, provides
what is ostensibly another illustration of third-party liability for
wage payment. After the Director receives a complaint of unpaid
wages, he may order a person indebted to the employer (including a
bank or credit union with which the employer has an account) to pay
the amount owing to the Tribunal, which acts as trustee for the
employer pending determination of the complaint. If the Director
19. Refer to the Gray Report, supra, note 5, at 71-72, for a more in-depth
treatment of this subject, and examples of third-party liability not mentioned in this
paper.
20. For example, Business CorporationAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 53, s. 139; Payment
of Wages Act, S.B.C. 1962, c. 45, s. 15A, as amended by S.B.C. 1973, c. 68, s.

13
21. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 171, s. 79
22. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 316, s. 50
23. S.C. 1974-75, c.33, s.114
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finds the complaint to be justified, the Tribunal uses such funds to
pay the employee, and returns any surplus to the employer.
While s.81 appears to be a form of third-party liability in
substance it merely provides for indirect payment by the employer,
because the money paid is already owing to him. The advantage of
this method is that the Director can order payment to the Tribunal
before it is even decided that an employer is indebted to a
complainant.
(6) UpaidWages as a PreferredDebt
24
(a) Claims under the Bankruptcy Act
When an employer makes an assignment of his property in
bankruptcy, or if he is petitioned into bankruptcy, an unpaid
employee may prove his claim under the Bankrupty Act. Section 2
of that Act defines "secured creditor" as:
a person holding a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or
privilege on or against the property of the debtor or any part
thereof as security for a debt due or accruing due to him from the
debtor, or a person whose claim is based upon, or secured by, a
negotiable instrument held as collateral security and upon which
the debtor is only indirectly or secondarily liable.
Section 107(l)(d) gives a wage-claimant preferred status, subject to
the rights of secured creditors and payment of the costs of
administration of the bankruptcy. This priority covers only
"wages... for services rendered during three months next
preceding the bankruptcy to the extent of five hundred dollars in
' 25
each case.
Three categories of wage-earners are excepted from preferred
creditor status: (i) an employee (of a bankrupt) who is a father, son,
daughter, mother, brother, sister, uncle or aunt by blood or
marriage (s. 109); (ii) officers and directors of a bankrupt
corporation (s. 111); and (iii) spouse or former spouse of a bankrupt
(s. 108 (2)). Unlike the other two excepted categories, which may
still rank with the masses of unsecured unpreferred creditors, wage
claims of a spouse or former spouse are deferred until payment in
full of all other creditors.
Of all the difficulties with the present scheme of distribution
24. R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3
25. The IWinding-Up Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. W-10, S. 72 confers a similar priority
on wage claims for debts incurred during the three months immediately preceding
the winding-up order.
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under the Bankrupty Act, four are particularly noteworthy in this
context. First, with increasing resort to secured financing, a large
portion of the bankrupt's assets are consumed by realizing claims of
secured creditors, leaving a relatively small amount to be divided
among unsecured creditors. 26 The priority accorded to wage
claimants is certainly not a guarantee of full payment of their debts.
Second, the limits placed on the time and amount of wages to be
accorded preference under s. 107(d) are unreasonable and unrealistic. Most wage earners would refuse - or could not afford - to
work beyond three months without pay so, in that sense, the time
limit imposes no hardship. However not all wage claims stem from
the three months "next preceding" bankruptcy, leaving upaid
employees with earlier claims to scramble for assets with the mass
of creditors without a preferred status.
The $500 ceiling on wage claims is too low, considering current
drastic inflation rates in prices and wages throughout Canada. 27
Calculated on the basis of Nova Scotia's minimum wage of $2.75
per hour, earned in a 40-hour work week, an employee would earn
$1320. in three months, disregarding holiday pay, vacation pay,
overtime and fringe benefits. Moreover, the average employee's
wage rate exceeds the minimum wage. 2 8
Third, the exceptions of family and spouse from wage protection
on bankruptcy penalizes employees for a relationship with the
employer which is irrelevant to the debt owing under an
26. The Report of the Superintendentof Bankruptcy, 1973-4 (Information Canada:
Ottawa, 1975), at 18, indicates that there were a total of 2,934 business
bankruptcies in Canada in the 1973 calendar year. Of this total, $65,651,000. of
assets went to secured creditors, and $38,814,000. to unsecured creditors. Secured
creditors realized approximately 63% of the total assets, compared to about 37%
realized by unsecured creditors.
In Nova Scotia, there were a total of 17 business bankruptcies in 1973. Of this
total, $143,000. of assets went to secured creditors, and $119,000. to unsecured
creditors. Secured creditors realized approximately 55% of the total assets,
compared to about 45% realized by unsecured creditors. There were $534,000. in
debts unpaid to general or unpreferred creditors, which is about twice the total
amount of assets paid to secured and unsecured creditors ($262,000.).
27. Supra, note 5, at 124-125
28. The proposed new Bankruptcy Act, An Act representing Bankruptcy and
Insolvency, Bill C-60, 1st session, 30th Parliament, 23-24 Eliz. II, 1974-75,
directed itself to these first two problems by giving wage-earners priority over
secured creditors for unpaid wages of up to $2,000. However, as a result of the
strongly negative response of the Senate Banking, Trade and Commerce
Committee to the Bill (of The ProposedBankruptcy Act, 1975, with Commentary,
Marantz, Woloshen and Zwaing (Toronto: Richard de Boo, 1975) at 27-28),
secured creditors have since been restored to their traditional position of priority.
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employment contract. The fact of being a relative of an employer
does not reduce an employee's entitlement to renumeration for
services rendered, or his need for wages owed to him.
Fourth, recent authorities indicate that s. 107(l)(d) does not
encompass employee's claims for severance pay. The LSC, s.68(4),
provides for immediate termination by means of written notice and
payment of an amount equal to wages for the required period of
notice. This payment is probably not recoverable in the event of a
claim under s. 107(i)(d). In Re Malone Lynch Securities Ltd. ,29 an
employer's bankruptcy resulted in termination of employment
without notice. The employee claimed for severance pay under
s.13(2) of the Employment Standards Act of Ontario. 30 The
Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Employment
StandardsAct requiring notice on termination of employment were
inapplicable to termination caused by the bankruptcy of the
employer. The Act, as a whole, was never intended to apply in a
situation of bankruptcy because, inter alia, proof of claims could
only be filed for claims in existence at the date of bankruptcy. A
similar situation arose in Re Lewis' Department Store Ltd., 3 1
wherein it was decided that s. 107(l)(d) priority for "wages. . . for
services rendered during three months next preceding the
bankruptcy" did not apply to severance pay.
In sum, while the Bankruptcy Act improves the relative ability of
a wage creditor to realize a claim upon an employer's bankruptcy, it
leaves significant gaps as a method of wage protection.
(b) Claims under Various Provincial Statutes
The Ontario Employment Standards Act, 32 s.14, confers on
wage-earners priority to the claims of all preferred, ordinary or
general creditors of an employer, up to $2,000. per employee,
except in the case of bankruptcy. The inadequacy of this approach is
evidenced by Campeau Corporation v. ProvincialBank of Canata
et al.
which dealt with s.8(1), the forerunner of s.14 of the
Ontario Act. Section 8(1) reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Act, a person to
whom unpaid wages are due and owing by an employer shall
have first priority over the claims or rights, including the claims
.3

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

(1972), 17 C.B.R. (N.S.) 105 (Ont. S.C.)
R.S.O. 1970, c. 147
(1972), 17 C.B.R. (N.S.) 113 (Ont.)
S.O. 1974, c. 112, s. 14
(1975), 20 C.B.R. (N.S.) 99 (Ont. S.C.)
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or rights of the Crown, of all preferred, ordinary or general
creditors of the employer to the extent of $2,000.
It should be noted that, although very similar to s.14, s.8(l)
contained no proviso about bankruptcy. The Campeau case may
have led legislators to insert the proviso in the amended Act. The
question before the court was the priority to be accorded to
competing claims of a bank (as assignee of book debts) and unpaid
employees (claiming under s.8(l) of the Employment Standards
Act). It was held that the employees were not entitled to payment,
because s.8(1) only provided priority over other unsecured
creditors, but not over secured creditors. A significant obiter was
that s.8(l) was inapplicable to claims under the Bankruptcy Act, in
effect limiting preferred claims of Ontario wage-earners to $500. in
a bankruptcy situation.
Thus, preferred creditor status under the Ontario Act does not
ensure payment to employees whenever an employer has creditors
with secured debts. As will be seen, the Nova Scotia Labour
Standards Codes provides a greater measure of wage protection.
Other Nova Scotian legislation makes wage-earners preferred
creditors in specific non-bankruptcy situations. The Assignments
and Preferences Act, 34 s.21, provides that when an employer makes
an assignment for the general benefit of creditors the assignee shall
pay up to three months' wage claims of his employees in priority to
other creditors. Under the Creditors' Relief Act, 35 s.23, where the
sheriff seizes funds of an execution debtor, employees of the debtor
shall be paid in priority to all other claims, up to three months'
wages. If the funds seized are insufficient to pay wage claims in
full, then they shall be paid rateably.
Such provisions are helpful to employees in the particular
situations described ,but are of limited application.
(7) Unpaid Wages as a SecuredDebt
(a) Bonding
Legislation may require employers to post a bond as security for
unpaid wages. The Alberta IndustrialWages Security Act 36 requires
all employers in designated industries to post bonds each year,
34. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 16, s. 21
35. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 70, s. 23
36. R.S.A. 1970, c. 184
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unless they have become exempt through proving reliability in wage
payment. While such a system is an ongoing expense to employers,
as well as to tax-payers financing its administration, it ensures that
money will always be available for wage payment.
Under the Nova Scotia Labour Standards Code, bonding is a
remedial measure, rather than preventive. Section 80 37 empowers
the Tribunal to order an employer to post a bond of a regulated
amount, and apply the proceeds of the bond toward payment of the
employer's debt. This technique is only available in the event of an
appeal to the Tribunal. Moreover, it will be ineffective if an
employer is insolvent, because an employer who cannot afford to
pay wages will not be able to afford a bond.
(b) Statutory Liens
Section 84 of the Labour Standards Code creates a statutory lien
in the following language:
84 (1) Notwithstanding any other Act, an order of the Tribunal
under Section 24 constitutes a lien and charge in favour of the
Tribunal for the amount set forth in the order and the amount set
forth in the order is a debt due or accruing due to the Tribunal by
the employer and the Tribunal shall be deemed to hold a
mortgage on the assets of the employer to the amount set forth in
the order and may enforce the mortgage by foreclosure
proceedings.
(2) The lien and charge and mortgage referred to in subsection (2)
shall be payable in priority over all liens, charges or mortgages of
every person in respect of the real and personal property of the
employer, including those of the Crown in the right of the
Province, but excepting liens for wages due to workmen by that
employer. 3 8
Of the methods considered thus far, this is potentially the most
effective and far-reaching. On first glance, it appears to overcome
the problems facing wage-earners as preferred creditors and as
claimants under the Bankruptcy Act. By holding a lien, charge or
mortgage the Tribunal is elevated to the level of a secured creditor
and is thereby well equipped to enforce payment of wage debts.
When competing with other secured creditors a s. 84-lien-holder has
express priority in entitlement to assets of the employer. Upon a
debtor's bankruptcy a s.84-lienholder can ostensibly claim as a
37. S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, s. 80, as amended by S.N.S. 1976, c. 41, s. 19
38. S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, s. 84, as amended by S.N.S. 1975, c. 50, s. 3; 1976, c.
41, s. 21
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secured creditor rather than with preferred status conferred by
s. 107(l)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act.
However, statutory liens have been confronted with serious
problems. First, because an increasingly large number of secured
creditors may compete for the assets of a single debtor little may
remain even to be divided amongst them when insolvency or
bankruptcy occurs.
Second, a related consideration is the confusion caused by the
growing number of statutory liens. Many provincial and federal
statutes create statutory liens with substantially similar priority
provisions. 39 "Priority" loses its meaning when it is conferred on
all claimants. This is clearly illustrated by Re KRA RestaurantsLtd.
and Toronto Dominion Bank et al.,40 although the case itself
involved statutory trusts rather than liens. The Crown in the right of
Canada was claiming under the Canada Pension Plan4 ' and the
Unemployment InsuranceAct, 42 and the Crown in the right of the
Province of Nova Scotia was claiming under the Health Services
Tax Act. 4 3 The purpose of each of the relevant provisions was to
create a trust to enable the Crown to have priority over other claims
in the event of bankruptcy of the debtor. Inter alia, the Supreme
Court had to determine the priority among the Crown claimants. It
was held that the Crown in each of its capacities was entitled to take
in rateable proportions.
Third, while s.84 is not explicit on this matter, it would appear
that the lien arises upon the making of the Tribunal's order. This is
indicated by the words ". . . an order of the Tribunal under Section
24 constitutes a lien and charge in favour of the Tribunal..." By
39. Provisions of other Nova Scotia stautues creating liens with express
priority-provisions include: Assessment Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 14, ss. 135 and
153; Corporation Tax Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 61, s. 30; Fire Prevention Act,
R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 107, s. 13 (1), (2); Gypsum Mining Income Tax Act, R.S.N.S.
1967, c. 122, s.11; Halifax City Charter ss. 305, 206, 310; Health Services Tax
Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 126, s. 23; Mechanics's Lien Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 178,
ss. 14 (1), 32(1), (2); Mineral Resources Act, S.N.S. 1975, c. 12, s. 102;
Municipal Affairs Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 193, s. 19; Municipal Land Transfer Tax
Act, S.N.S. 1968, C. 10, s. 12; Power Commission Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 233, s.
62; Warehousemen's Lien Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 334, s. 2; Woodemen's Lien
Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 342, s. 3; Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967
c. 343, s. 144 (1).

40. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 272 (N.S.S.C. (T.D.))
41. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-5, s. 24

42. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 71
43. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 126, s. 23
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the time the lien arises property may already have passed to a "bona
fides purchaser for value without notice", or an employee may
already have made an assignment in bankruptcy. In both cases, the
44
lien will be unenforceable.
Fourth, constitutional difficulties may arise in the event of an
employer's bankruptcy if the statutory lien is seen as provincial
interference with the allocation of priorities under s. 107(1)(d) of the
federal Bankruptcy Act. However in In Re Clemenshaw,4 5 which
involved a lien created by s.48 of the B.C. Workmen's
Compensation Act 6 the British Columbia Court of Appeal held
that s.48 made the Board a secured creditor and that status was not
removed by s. 107(l)(i) of the Bankruptcy Act. This judgment
demonstrates a judicial willingness to recognize statutory liens
under the Bankruptcy Act.
Fifth, the artificial creation of secured credit may jeopardize the
development of secured financing. The conflicting social values
involved in this issue, and the underlying preferences displayed by
the courts in relation to it, will be developed further in Part IIl.
Security for wages through liens is provided not only under the
Labour Standards Code but also by other provincial legislation,
such as the Mechnaics' Lien Act, 47 sections 14(1) and 32(1) and
(2), the Warehousemen's Lien Act,4 8 s.2, and the Woodmen's Lien
Act, 4 9 s.3. The Mechanics' Lien Act imposes liability on
land-owners for wages of the unpaid employees of contractors and
sub-contractors. The owner is required to withhold a certain portion
of payments to contractors,based on a percentage of the cost of
labour on his project. Employees' claims are paid from this
"holdback" fund. The lien arises when the first work or service is
performed and, according to s.23(1), the lien may be registered
,efore, during, or forty-five days after performance of the
ontract. 50 If the land-owner does not pay the lien claims within
44. Collection of materials on "Wage Protection", submitted by Judy Haldeman
for Employment Law Seminar, Dalhousie University, at 11.
45. (1963),4 C.B.R. (N.S.) 238 (B.C.C.A)
46. R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 413
47. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 178, ss. 14(1), 32(1), (2)
48. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 334, s. 2
49. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 342, s. 3
50. Report to the Attorney General of the Nova Scotia Law Reform Advisory
7
ommission on Builders' Liens (Halifax: Queen's Printers, 1976); Study papers by
Professor P. E. Darby, pp. 71 et seq.
3ection 8 of the Mechanics' Lien Act implies that the lien's priority arises upon
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three months, the lienholder is entitled to judicial sale of land, and
payment from the proceeds of the sale.
In comparison to a lien arising under s.84 of the Labour
Standards Code, a mechanics' lien is more "secure" in that it arises
at an earlier time and it is payable from an existing fund. Further,
the concept is better established and accepted by the courts. Note,
however, that a mechanics' lienholder is the individual wageearner, whereas a s.84 lien is created in favour of the Tribunal.
(c) The Bank Act 51
The Bank Act, s.88, authorizes a bank to make loans, taking
security in the form of goods produced by the debtor, or used by
him in the course of production. Subsection (5) gives priority to
employees of the debtor over the claim of the bank, when the bank
realizes its security in this particular form. Employees may claim
for unpaid wages incurred in the three months next preceding the
making of an assignment in bankruptcy by their employer, or of a
receiving order against him. This security interest in favour of
employees obviously creates no constitutional problem of recognition under the Bankruptcy Act, and is an effective method of
enhancing a wage-earner's preferred creditor status established by
s. 107(l)(d).
(8) Statutory Trusts
A trust, in this context, is actually a form of secured interest
ensuring payment of a loan. However, because the sections creating
statutory liens and trusts are distinct under the Labour Standards
Code, and because trusts and secured credit are treated separately by
the Bankruptcy Act, they will be discussed separately herein.
The Nova Scotia LSC, s.34, deems an employer to be trustee of
vacation pay for his employees. That trust is "a charge upon the
assets of the employer or his estate in his hands or the hands of a
registration. However, it has been held that, where a judgment creditor recovered
after the lien arose but registered before the lien was registered, the lienholder still
had priority. (See W. Eric Whebby Ltd. et al. v. Regency Construction Co. Ltd.,
October 18, 1967, N.S.Co.CT., unreported.)
This opinion was recently confirmed in Silver et al. v. R.R. Seeton Construction
Ltd. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 212 (N.S.Co.Ct.), at p. 226. In that case, O'Hearn,
Co. Ct. J. decided that, by virtue of s. 14(1), the lien arises when work is
commenced, before registration, and it takes priority even though not registered
until later, despite s. 8.
51. R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1, s. 88
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trustee and has priority over all other claims." The purpose of this
statutory trust becomes clear in the situation of a bankrupt employer
when, by virtue of s.47(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, property held by
the bankrupt in trust for any other person does not vest in the trustee
in bankruptcy. Section 34 is thus an attempt to exempt vacation pay
from distribution with other property of the bankrupt. Both ss.34
and 94 are deliberate attempts to circumvent s.lM7tl) d) of the
Bankruptcy Act by improving the status of the wage-earner from
that of preferred to that of secured creditor.
An alternative to the s.34 "deemed trust" is illustrated by the
Ontario Employment Standards Act, 52 s. 15, which creates a
"fictional trust" of vacation pay funds. Whether or not an employer
has actually deducted vacation pay, he is deemed to have done so.
This eliminates the need for the beneficiary/employee to trace the
deduction into the assets of the employer, and to ascertain what
53
property is the subject of the trust.

Four basic problems with this method of wage protection have
been encountered. First, statutory trusts, and in particular fictional
trusts, are theoretically objectionable as they depart from the normal
concept of a trust. 54 Where an employer fails to deduct vacation
pay, there is no existing property to form the subject-matter of a
trust. Mr. Justice Romer deplored the artificiality of such statutory
creatures:
It is, of course, quite permissible to "deem" a thing to have
happened when it is not known whether it happened or not. It is
an unusual but not an impossible conception to "deem" that a
thing happened when it is known positively that it did not. To
deem, however, that a thing happened, when not only is it known
that it did not happen, but it is positively known that precisely the
opposite of it happened, is a conception which to my mind...
amounts to a complete absurdity. 5 5
52. S.O. 1974, c. 112, s. 15
53. Re DeslauriersConstructionProductsLimited;Attorney Generalof Canadav.
Derlmutter(1972), 14 C.B.R. (N.S.) 197 (Ont.C.A.), at p. 201
-Ioulden and Morawitz state the general rule of tracing trust property:
A cestui que trust may claim as subject to the trust, any proceeds which the
trustee has received for the trust property or any property into which the trustee
has invested or converted trust property or the proceeds thereof, provided that
the property claimed can be identified as the product into which the trust
property can be traced.
Bankruptcy Law of Canada(Toronto: The Carswell Co. Ltd. 1960), at 109
54. D. E. Baird, "Comment" (1973), C.B.R. (N.S.) 273 at 276
55. Robert Batcheller&Sons, Ltd. v. Batcheller, [1945] 1All E. R. 522, at 530
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Despite objections to their artificiality, courts have consistently
upheld statutory trusts as valid, satisfying the general requirements
of the law of trusts. 5 6 Courts have resigned themselves to the
ultimate authority of the legislature in this field.
Second, the constitutional question recurs, because of what
David Baird calls "this insidious attempt to quietly and ruthlessly
supersede the priorities set out in s.107(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy
Act. 5 7 This problem recently arose before the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court in MacMillan et al. v. Frizzell Plumbing and Heating Ltd. et
al.58 Morrison, J. had to decide whether employees of an insolvent
employer, claiming under the statutory trust created by s.34 of the
LSC, had priority over the claim of a debenture-holder. The Court
resolved the matter in favour of the employees, holding that no
constitutional problem existed. Under s.34, the trust arose when
wages were earned by the employees, and was already attached to
the property of the employer when it came into the hands of a
receiver. Thus, the creation of the trust is independent of the
employer's insolvency, and is constitutionally valid. 5 9
Third, as statutory trusts become more frequently employed by
federal and provincial legislators a problem develops of sorting out
priorities among the various claimants under statutory trusts, as well
as in relation to other secured interests. The matter of competing
priorities among statutory trusts has already been discussed. 60 With
regard to the priority of statutory trusts over secured creditors, there
is conflicting case law on the matter, and the present situation in
Canada is very unclear. Baird suggests that priority depends on the
date the trust arises (or is deemed to have been created), and
whether a specific secured interest was created before or after the
trust arose. 6 1 Baird's opinion accords with that of Morrison J. in
MacMillan v. Frizzell, 6 2where he said:
56. e.g., Re Dairy Maid Chocolates Ltd. (1972), 17 C.B.R. (N.S.) 270; Re
Deslauriers Construction Products Limited; Attorney General of Canada v.
Perlmutter,supra, note 53
57. Supra, note 54, at 275
58. (1975), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 415 (N.S.S.C.) (T.D.)
59. Refer to John M.M. TroupLtd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1962] S.C.R. 487;
Re Dairy Maid ChocolatesLtd., supra, footnote 55; and Re KRA RestaurantsLtd.
and Toronto Dominion Bank, supra, footnote 40, upholding the right of the
provinces to create trusts which will be effective under the Bankruptcy Act.
60. Supra, text accompanying notes 38-43
61. D. E. Baird, "Statutory Trusts Liens - Priority Over Claims of Secured
Creditors" (1978), 25 C.B.R. (N.S.) 261 at 265
62. Supra, note 58 at 430-431
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Section 34 is not restrospective. It does not attempt to change the
law before 1973. On February 1, 1973 [the date of proclamation
of the LSC], any vacation pay accruing due at that time became
protected by the trust. In my opinion, to escape the effect of this
trust the debenture would have had to be crystallized by January
vacation pay became
31, 1973. Subsequent to February 1, 1973,
63
impressed with the trust as it was earned.
Two recent Nova Scotia decisions indicate that the priority of a
statutory trust is largely a factor of the precise wording of the
provisions creating the trusts. In Re KRA Restaurants,64 the Trial
Division of the Supreme Court held that the CanadaPensionPlan,
the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Health Services Tax Act
do not give the Crown priority over secured creditors. The decision
turned on the words "assets of the estate" in the first two Acts, and
"assets in the hands of the trustee" in the last Act. These words
indicate that the trust was only to be imposed on those funds
generated from the realization of unencumbered assets by the trustee
in bankruptcy.
Re KRA Restaurants was followed by Glube J. in Bank of Nova
Scotia v. Middleton Motors Ltd.,65 where a debenture-holder
competed with the Crown claiming under trust provisions of the
federal and provincial Income Tax Acts, 66 Canada Pension Plan

and Unemployment Insurance Act. These cases indicate the infinite
mutations of statutory trusts, and the significance of the wording of
their provisions for the ultimate effect of the trusts.
Finally, it should be noted that a trust is an equitable interest,
whereas a lien is a legal interest. Where the equities are equal, a
legal interest will prevail. This equitable maxim may explain the
insertion in s.34 of provisions creating both a mortgage (which is a
legal interest) and a trust. Subsection (2) deems an employee to hold
a mortgage to the amount of vacation pay due, and Subsection (3)
confers priority on the mortgage similar to the scope of priority
under a s.84-lien. What seems on first sight to be an instance of
statutory overkill may merely be compensation for the inherent
weakness of equitable claims.
63. But See Re A. L. CharleboisLtd. [1977] 3 W.W.R. 741 (Sask, Q.B.) where a
deemed trust was determined to have priority over a loan secured by an assignment
of book debts and a debenture. Priority was granted without consideration to when
the statutory trust axose.
64. Supra, note 40

65. (1978), 29 N.S.R. (2d) 561 (N.S.S.C.) (T.D.)
66, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-5, s. 227 (4), (5) and R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 134, s. 36(4), (5)
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One may logically ask, why should the legislature create a trust at
all if it is inherently disadvantageous or, in other words, why should
vacation pay be segregated under a statutory trust? Would it not be
more effective and consistent protection to combine ss.34 and 84;
that is, why not create a lien for all forms of unpaid wages,
including vacation pay, and expressly provide that such lien arises
as soon as wages are earned? The effectiveness of such a provision
will be considered when s.5A of the Payment of Wages Act of
British Columbia is examined in Part III of this paper.
HI. Section 5A and the Homeplan Judgment
The matter of the priority assigned by statute to claims for unpaid
wages assumes particular significance in the context of statutory
liens. The B.C. Payment of Wages Act 67 creates one of the most
sophisticated statutory liens in any provincial jurisdiction. It is
therefore of general relevance to determine how far the courts have
been willing to go in protecting wage claims brought under s.5A.
Section 5A reads:
(1) Notwithstanding any other Act, the amount of wages set forth
in a certificate issued under section 5 constitutes a lien and charge
in favour of the Board payable in priority over any other claim or
right, including those of the Crown in right of the Province and,
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, such priority
shall extend over every assignment, including an assignment of
book debts, whether absolute or otherwise, every mortgage of
real or personal property, and every debenture.
(2) A certificate issued under section 5 shall constitute a lien and
charge under subsection (1) from the date wages were earned,
and shall extend to all moneys due from any source to the
employer named in the certificate, including moneys due or
accruing due from any contract, account receiveable, and
insurance claim.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) shall apply to every certificate issued
under section 5, whether issued before or after this section comes
into force.
This section creates a lien in favour of the Board of Industrial
Relations, which acts on behalf of an unpaid employee. The
operation of a s.5A lien is activated by the Board issuing a
certificate of wages owing to an employee, accrued within a
67. Supra, note 1. The Manitoba Payment of Wages Act, S.M. 1975, c. 21, s. 7,
as am by S.M. 1976, c. 69, s. 35 is very similar to s.5A of the B.C. Act. Its
wording may be preferable to that of s.5A, in that it is less ambiguous about the
property to which the lien attaches, and the retroactive effect of the provision.
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maximum of the last six months. The operation of the lien has been
problematic in three basic aspects: (1) the time at which the lien
arises; (2) the property to which the lien attaches; and (3) the claims
over which the lien has priority.
(1) Section 5A(2) indicates the intent of the Legislature to make
the lien retroactive to the time the wages were earned. The B.C.
County Court, in interpreting the predecessor to the present section
5A, held that the lien is created the moment the wages are owed to
an employee, irrespective of the date a certificate is filed.68
(2) The 1970 amendments to the B.C. Payment of Wages Act
created a lien "in respect of the real or personal property of the
employer." This clause was omitted in the 1973 version of s.5A,
leaving the provision open to the interpretation that the lien applied
to property interests other than those owned by an employer. Such a
construction would enhance the protection provided by the lien,
because a greater quantity of property would be available as security
for wage debts. So far B.C. courts have refused the invitation to
broaden the scope of a s.5A lien.
Henfry v. Board of Industrial Relations69 involved the determining of priorities between certificates under the Payment of
Wages Act and a debenture executed by the employer. The plaintiff
contended that s.5A was ineffective to create a lien because it failed
to specify the property to which the lien attached. Hinkson J. held
that a valid lien was created, because the words of s.5A indicate that
the lien was intended to attach to the real or personal property of the
employer. The court merely implied into the present s.5A the clause
which was dropped from the 1970 amendment of the Act. It viewed
the omission as a legislative oversight, rather than a deliberate
technique to increase the amount of property available to satisfy a
wage creditor's lien.
In OceanAir ConditioningandRefrigeration ContractorsLtd. v.
Dan et al.,70 claimants under the Payment of Wages Act were
competing with mechanics' lienholders. The s.5A lienholders were
employed by Image Development, a subcontractor of A&W, the
general contractors, whereas the mechanics' lienholders were
claiming against A&W. A&W paid money into court to have the
mechanics' liens cancelled. The Board of Industrial Relations
68. Board of IndustrialRelations v. Bingham Sawmills Ltd. and Trethewey-Wells
TimberLtd., B.C.Co.Ct., December 1972 (unreported).
69. [1976] 4W.W.R. 427 (B.C.S.C.)
70. [1977] 3 W.W.R. 456 (B.C.C.A.)
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submitted that the s.5A lienholders were entitled to payment out of
the mechanics' lien holdback money. Commenting on this
submission, Bull J. A. said:
But the section is incapable of any other construction than that the
lien or charge. . . must be a lien or charge on the property of the
employer (Image) and not on the property of others (A&W).'71
This dictum accords with the narrow construction of s.5A by
72
Hinkson J. in Henfrey.
(3) Section 5A confers on the lien "priority over any other claim
or right", compared to its predecessor, which gave priority to the
Board "over all liens, charges, or mortgages of every person".
Arguably, the 1973 amendments expanded the scope of the Board's
priority by using more general language. The B.C. Court of Appeal,
however, in Ocean Air Conditioning,73 interpreted the provision
restrictively, holding that the 1973 amendments eliminated the
Board's priority over liens. The mechanics' lien thereby should be
paid in preference to claims made under a s.5A certificate.
Except for the matter of the time the lien arises, it seems that
courts are reluctant to give effect to the language of s.5A, despite
the primafacie intent of the legislators to broaden wage protection
by means of the statutory lien. Such reluctance is more readily
understood when viewed in the context of the common law rule of
priorities in commercial transactions. It is well established that
"where the equities are equal, the first in time wins". In other
words, where there is a competition for priority between two legal
interests or between two equitable interests the interest which was
executed at the earlier date takes priority. This rule has been
complicated somewhat by the introduction of statutes requiring
registration, but where all competing interests have been properly
registered the common law rule of "first in time" remains in force.
If read literally section 5A of the Payment of Wages Act derogates
from the common law by conferring absolute priority on a
wage-earner's lien, regardless of the date of execution. Judges
schooled in the traditional rules of priority hesitate to adopt the
literal meaning and defeat prior registered interests.
The section 5A lien was recently re-examined by the British
Columbia Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada in
71 Id., at 457
72. Supra, note 69
73. Supra, note 70.
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Board of Industrial Relations v. Avco Financial Services Realty
74
Limited andHomeplan Realty Limited.
The significance of Homeplan lies in the typical nature of its
facts, and the consequently broad implications which the judgment
has for employees and secured creditors caught in similar situations.
Defendants Melvin and Shirley Goodine owned land in fee simple.
On August 1, 1973, they executed a first mortgage on the land, for
$16,300. plus interest, in favour of Homeplan Realty Limited. On
February 5, 1974, they executed a second mortgage for $9,000.
plus interest, in favour of Midtown Securities Limited. On February
8, 1974, Midtown assigned the second mortgage to Avco Financial
Services Realty Limited.
On December 6 and 18, 1974, two certificates of the Board of
Industrial Relations were made pursuant to s.5(l)(c) of the Payment
of Wages Act (hereafter called the Act), asserting that Goodine was
an employer who owed wages to employees, totalling $8,804.80.
The mortgages, assignment and certificates were all registered in
the Land Registry Office. Thus Homeplan involved a classic
competition between secured interests all properly registered.
In February, 1975, Homeplan began foreclosure proceedings
against Goodine and obtained an order for sale of the land.
Subsequently, the land was sold for $28,100. and the proceeds were
held in trust pending determination of priorities of distribution by
the B.C. Supreme Court.
At trial, 75 Ruttan J. decided that the employees' certificates took
priority over the mortgages, with the result that the wage claims and
Homeplan were paid in full, but Avco, the second mortgagee,
received no payment. On appeal by Avco to the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, Robertson J. A. for the majority overturned the
trial decision. He held that the mortgagees had priority over the
wage creditors because their claims were registered before the date
the wages were earned. This resulted in non-payment of a large
share of the wage debt. Craig J.A., dissenting, agreed with the
judgment of Ruttan J. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously
dismissed an appeal by the Board of Industrial Relations.
Closer examination of the Homeplan decisions of the lower
courts indicates differences of opinion among the judges on many of
74. June 14, 1979, S.C.C. (unreported), Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Bee2,
Estey, J.J. Appeal from (1978), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (B.C.C.A.), dismissed
75. Homeplan Realty Ltd. v. Goodine et al., B.S.S.C., August 3, 1976
(unreported)
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the basic issues posed by the s.5A statutory lien.
First, the validity of the lien created by s.5A of the Act seems to
be assumed by all of the judges. Even Robertson J. A., who placed
the severest restrictions on the operation of the statutory lien,
conceded that it would take priority over charges registered after the
wages are earned.
Second, the question of the time that the lien arises was handled
succinctly by Ruttan J. in the following words:
The lien crystallizes as soon as the wages are earned, whether or
not the certificate has been registered. At that point of time, the
lien is charged against the property, and, by reading subsection
(2) with subsection (1), I76conclude that the property of the lien is
created at the same time.
This is a literal interpretation of s.5A(2), with which Robertson J.
A. apparently agreed. He observed that, when a certificate is issued
by the Board, it constitutes "a lien and charge retroactively from the
77
date they [the wages] were earned".
Third, on the matter of the extent of priority of a certificate over
competing claims, the relevant portion of s.5A states that the
certificate:
• . . constitutes a lien and charge . . . payable in priority over
any other claim or right, including those of the Crown in right of
the Province, and, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, such priority shall extend over every assignment,
including an assignment of book debts, whether absolute or
otherwise, every mortgage of real or personal property, and
every debenture.
Ruttan J. again gave s.5A a broad and literal reading, saying, "To
me it appears obvious that the lien takes priority over all charges as
78
spelled out in subsection (1) of Section 5A."
To the contrary, Robertson J.A. interpreted s.5A, subsection (2)
as qualifying the broad priority given wage claimants under
subsection (1), such that only charges registered after the earning of
wages would be superseded by a s.5(l)(c) certificate. Charges
registered beforehand would themselves take priority.
This narrow approach seems to confuse two separate questions:
the date when the lien crystallizes, and the extent of the lien's
priority. These questions are treated separately in the Act in
76. Id. at4
77. Supra, note 74, at 294
78. Supra, note 75, at4
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subsections (2) and (1) respectively, where it is stated that ". . . a
certificate issued . . . shall constitute a lien and charge under

subsection (1) from the date the wages were earned", and such lien
is "payable in priority over any other claim or right". In effect
Robertson J. A. said that the date the lien arises determines the
scope of its priority, reading in an arbitrary boundary to the priority
of the lien. This approach denies meaning to the words "any other
claim or right" and "every mortgage of real or personal property",
and limits the implicit intent of the Legislature to broaden the rights
and remedies of wage creditors.
Fourth, the problem of determining the property to which the lien
attaches, which is not specified by s.5A, confronted the court in
Homeplan. It is a problem fundamental to the operation of the s.5A
lien, and until decisively resolved will recur in most situations of
competing claims between secured creditors. At the trial level,
without discussing the reasons for his conclusion, Ruttan J. adopted
the position of Henfrey v. Board of IndustrialRelations7 9 that s.5A
creates a charge against the property of the employer. Dissenting
from the Court of Appeal, Craig J.A. also agreed with Henfrey. He
clarified Hinkson J.'s interpretation, explaining that "the lien
attaches to the interest which the employer has in that property,
regardless of the nature of that interest." 80
It seems that Ruttan J. and Craig J.A. failed to consider the
implications of their decision for the operation of the statutory lien
in general, and in the context of this particular case. Their final
disposition of Homeplan is inconsistent with the narrow approach
taken in regard to the property to which the lien attaches. At the date
of trial, the only interest which the Goodines had in their real
property was an equity of redemption, which was smaller than the
amount owing on the two mortgages. Neither Ruttan J. nor Craig J.
A. expressly questioned whether the amount of wages owing under
the certificate ($8,804.80) exceeded the employer's equitable
financial interest in his property. There is a strong possibility that it
did, considering the total amount of the mortgagees ($25,300) and
the price at which the land was sold ($28,100). If such was the case,
by giving the wage-earners priority over the mortgages the property
interest of one of the mortgagees would be charged with payment of
part of the wages. In effect, the s.5A lien would attach to the
79. Supra, note 69
80. Supra, note 74, at 301
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property of the mortgagees as well as the employer-mortgagor,
contrary to the Henfrey interpretation of this matter.
Perhaps the judges were reluctant to take the radical and
unprecedented step of extending the s.5A lien to interests in
property other than the employer's interests, and were uncertain
what boundaries to draw, if any, should such a liberal interpretation
be made. Or perhaps their concerns with the policy of wage
protection led them to resolve the overall priority question in favour
of the wage creditors. Such judicial fence-sitting benefits unpaid
employees in a particular case but generates uncertainty in the
long-term operation of the s.5A statutory lien and in the status of
wage protection in Canadian courts.
Robertson J.A., for the majority of the Court of Appeal, also
pointed to the problem of deciding the property to which the lien
attaches, lamented the ambiguity of s.5A in this respect, and then
made no effort to resolve the difficulty. He side-stepped the
problem by imposing a time limit on the priority of the statutory
lien, such that the lien was defeated by the pre-existing mortgages,
without having to deal directly with the question of whether the lien
could attach to the property interest of a person other than the
employer. However, he clearly indicated his attitude toward the
object of the lien, when he commented, "I feel . . . that the

language may not be sufficiently clear to warrant the implication
that will bring about the harm to the mortgagee that must result from
it.,81

Thus, while all the judgments favoured the restrictive Henfrey
interpretation that the lien attaches to the property of the employer,
the matter was deliberately left open by the majority judgment in the
Court of Appeal.
Underlying all of the aforementioned issues is the question of
statutory interpretation. Each of the judges acknowledged that the
statute derogates from the common law to some extent, by creating
a valid lien to secure wage payment. However, the extent of
derogation each was willing to allow depended on whether he
adopted a narrow or a liberal construction of the words of s.5A.
As has already become apparent from discussing the trial
judgment, Ruttan J. for the most part adopted a literal and liberal
interpretation of the Act. He quoted a revealing passage from the
B.C. Court of Appeal judgment in Workmen's CompensationBoard
v. Sumas Oil and Gas:
81. Id., at 295
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. . . The legislature can make the law which was formerly not the

law, and may destroy vested rights both at law and in equity if it
expresses its intention to do so. Has it done so by s.46? I am
satisfied that it has. There can be no question about the meaning
of the words used, though I feel that they would destroy to a great
extent confidence in securities of those lending money to
employers on mortgage securities, notwithstanding that the
secu'ities ae executed by the debtzy and D registratian are
protected by the Land Registry Act, .

. but if that is the intent

and meaning of the Act, that meaning must prevail in a Court of
Law and Equity .. 82
Ruttan J. went on to say that a similar right of priority has been
created by s.5A of the Payment of Wages Act.
Craig J.A., who agreed with the trial judge about the effect of
s.5A, expressly rejected the strict construction principle. He
observed that the Interpretation Act 83 demands a liberal construction in accordance with the purpose of each statute, and the object of
the Payment of Wages Act is wage protection, which he sought to
achieve.
However, in the decisions of both Ruttan J. and Craig J.A., a
notable exception to the principle of liberal interpretation is their
conclusion about the property to which the s.5A lien attaches. They
implied into the section a significant limitation on the scope of
operation of the statutory lien.
Robertson J.A. adopted a narrow approach to interpreting the
statute, refusing to defeat a registered charge unless such intention
was clearly expressed. As he explained,
If the Legislative Assembly intends to produce by statute results
that are so brutal and piratical, it has the power to do so, but the
Courts will hold that that was its intention only if the language of
84
the statute compels that interpretation.
In line with this approach, Robertson J.A. was able to read in
limitations to s.5A and thereby prevent the statute from derogating
from the common law to the extent of defeating charges registered
prior in time to the earning of wages.
This question of statutory interpretation is significant in that it
indicates how clear and unambiguous a statute must be to
effectively confer priority on wage claimants over a secured
interest, particularly over a registered charge. Even those judges
82. (1933), 3 D.L.R. 489 (B.C.C.A.), at491

83. S.B.C. 1974, c. 42, s. 8
84. Supra, note 74, at 292.

174 The Dalhousie Law Journal

who expressly proclaimed the principle of liberal construction were
inconsistent in its application. It is therefore not enough for
draftsmen to indicate the purpose of legislation and enact broad and
permissive provisions. The precise extent to which they intend to
vary the existing statute and common law must be clearly expressed
in order to be effective.
Most judges would probably disagree with the underlying
purpose of wage protection legislation. The "priorities" question
puts into competition the interests of wage protection and secured
financing, judged in the context of the social and economic needs of
the community. Those who favour protection of the rights of
secured creditors, 8 5 if they articulate a reason other than traditional
notions of free enterprise, express fears of serious disruption of the
commercial lending system. 86 Loss of the priority now enjoyed by
secured creditors would make secured transactions uncertain and
thus increase the cost of financing. Small businesses just starting
out, and labour-intensive industries, would have particular
difficulty proving that they could pay wage claims, with enough
capital remaining to pay their debts, in order to get a loan. Thus, it
is argued that giving absolute priority to wage-earners will prejudice
the position of other secured creditors.
Advocates of the interests of wage-earners point to the
responsibility of society to protect the innocent under-dog.
Employees contribute to the community and are entitled to
renumeration, but most are not in as good a position to enforce their
rights as are secured creditors. As is observed by A. J. Roman,
In the baldest terms, the present system is based on power. Those
who have the economic might and 8the
legal remedies obtain
7
security, those who do not do without.
Unpaid employees are often intimidated by their employer-debtor
and unaware of their rights, and have too little money to hold out for
85. Campeau Corporationv. ProvincialBank of Canadaet al., supra, note 33, at
105, where Houlden J. commented that in the Bankruptcy Act, ". . . the
Legislature has attempted to give priority to unpaid claims of wage-earners over
ordinary creditors in the case of bankruptcy ... While this is commendable, it is
also important that persons advancing money on the strength of security should
have their rights protected".
86. Report of the Senate Banking, Trade and Commerce Committee, Debates of
the Senate, Canada. Thursday, December 11, 1975. Discussed by M. A. Catzman,
"Employment Claims in Bankruptcy", 1976 Lecture Series of Upper Canada,
Lecture 213, at 219-220.
87. A. J. Roman, "Security Interests, Priorities and Economic Justice" (Term
Paper, Spring 1970)
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an advantageous settlement or to seek a legal remedy. Whereas
business creditors may recover their losses by charging such losses
against tax payments, wage creditors are offered no such options for
bad debts. It is further argued that those same legislators who
provide business incentives to employers must recognize their duty
to protect the rights and interests of employees.
Thus, HomepIan presented an oppomrtunity for jadiz ia guidance
in the balancing of these competing values. At the trial level, there
was no discussion of policy considerations raised by the case.
Ruttan J. mechanically interpreted the words of the Payment of
Wages Act, and applied them to the situation at hand.
Robertson J.A. reacted emotionally against the trial judment,
labelling its result "repugnant". s8 His decision indicates an
ingrained respect for secured financing as essential to a free
enterprise system, and a desire to avoid defeating registered
interests. Near the end of his judgment, after having saved the
secured interest of the second mortgagee at the expense of wage
claims, he commented,
I am convinced that the first part of s-s. (2) qualifies the
generality of s-s. (1) in the way that I have indicated, and in
reaching that conclusion I have the satisfaction of being able to
withdraw the adjectives "brutal and piratical" that I used earlier.
When the subsections are so read together, s.5A presents a much
less drastic appearance than it did when read alone. For example,
a person intending to lend money on mortgage has a reasonable
chance to ascertain by inquiry whether there are any wage claims
that are likely to take priority over his security or he may be
prepared to take a chance in the circumstances known to him; and
a person who has taken his security before any wages are earned
will not have his security destroyed or impaired by later unpaid
wages. 8 9
In marked contrast, Robertson J.A. was silent about the impact of
his decision on the wage creditors. Clearly His Lordship appeared
more concerned with protecting the innocent mortgagee than the
innocent wage-earner, but without reasons for holding this definite
policy preference or consideration of the object of the Payment of
Wages Act. His judgment may thus be seen as covert judicial
policy-making in favour of secured business creditors.
To the contrary, Craig J.A. expressed his view of the purpose of
the Act, and sought to give it effect:
88. Supra, note 74, at 291.
89. Id., at 296
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Having regard to the purpose of the legislation and the wording of
s-s.5A(1), I think that the priority "over any other claim or
right" and over "every mortgage of real or personal property"
includes claims or rights or mortgages which are prior in time to
the date when the wages were earned. . . It is true that there may
be cases (as apparently this case is) where this interpretation may
result in the prior mortgagee not being able to realize on his
security of payment of a debt owing to him, but I venture to think
that such cases will be the exception rather than the rule. 9 0
Once again, however there was no real discussion of the underlying
policy issues. From the approach taken by Craig J. A., two
conflicting inferences can be drawn. It is possible that for him wage
protection outweighs the social priority of protecting secured
transactions. Alternatively, perhaps he shares the values of the
majority of the court but is prepared to defer to the power of the
legislature rather than indulge in blatant judicial law-making.
In summary, it may be asked where the law on s.5A stood after
the Homeplan decision by the B.C. Court of Appeal. The majority
of the Court of Appeal thoroughly trounced the venture towards a
liberal construction of s.5A by Ruttan J. A new qualification on the
scope of the priority of the statutory lien was introduced: secured
interests registered before the lien arises were given priority of
payment over employees' claims. The question of the property to
which the lien attaches was deliberately left undecided. Finally, the
policy considerations of the Court of Appeal in relation to s.5A
were concealed, although the sympathies of the majority obviously
lay with secured business creditors. The basic question of why a
mortgagee should be able to realize fully on his security while a
wage-earner cannot, remained unanswered.
The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada provided the Court
with an opportunity to resolve the conflicting views of the lower
court judges with fully articulated reasons for decision to guide
courts in future questions of wage protection.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada was far from
radical. Martland J. adopted the judgment of the majority of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal. He agreed that a section 5A-lien
arises on the date the wages are earned, and that such a lien can only
take priority over claims registered after the lien attaches. However,
His Lordship went one step beyond the position of Robertson J. A.
by expressly delimiting the property to which the lien attaches to
90. Id., at 301,302
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"the employer's equity in that property." His judgment exemplifies
a literal approach to statutory interpretation, and the conventional
policy-outlook entrenching the rights of secured creditors. This
broad traditionalism is evident in the following passage:
The property to which a s.5A lien attaches is not defined nor
identified. In the absence of a specific statutory provision to that
effect, in my view it should not be consttued in a manner! which
could deprive third parties of their pre-existing property rights.91
Any uncertainties arising from the lower court decisions in
Homeplan were resolved in favour of secured business creditors.
Martland J. clearly signalled that the courts will not assist in the
reforming of laws concerning wage protection and secured
transactions.
IV. Section 84 of the Labour Standards Code
It would be useful to re-evaluate s.84 of Nova Scotia's LSC, in light
of the main issues raised in Homeplan in regard to s.5A: (I) the date
the lien arises; (2) the scope of priority of the lien; and (3) the
property to which the lien attaches.
(1) As has already been mentioned, 9 2 s.84 indicates that the
statutory lien arises at the time the Tribunal's order is made. The
advantage of s.5A over a s. 84-lien on the matter of timing is evident
in a situation of bankruptcy. When an employer goes bankrupt
before an order/certificate is issued against him, would the
proceedings be stayed? 93 Under s-5A, the Board could probably
continue its proceedings, because the lien is considered to have
existed retroactively from the date the upaid wages were earned,
before the employer's assignment in bankruptcy. However, under
s.84, proceedings by the Tribunal would likely be stayed,
discharging the employer's debt to his employees.
(2) A lien under s.84 has priority "over all liens, charges or
mortgages of every person . . . excepting liens for wages due to
workmen by that employer." Comparing s.84 and s.5A in isolation
from judicial interpretations one has the impression that s.5A
confers broader priority on the lien. However, it is arguable that
s.84 is broader because of its ability to avoid the restrictions
judicially imposed on a s.5A-lien. For example, the B.C. Court of
Appeal held that a s.5A-lien has no preference over a mechanics'
91. Unreported decision at 6
92. Supra, at 17
93. Supra, note 5 at 114

178 The Dalhousie Law Journal

lien, in part because the section no longer confers priority over other
liens since the 1973 amendments. 94 To the contrary, claimants
under s.84 are to be paid in express priority over other

lienholders. 95
The Supreme Court of Canada in Homeplan further restricted the
priority of s.5A liens to claims registered after the statutory lien
arises. Perhaps the absence of a provision in s.94 expressing the
time the lien arises will avoid a similar reading-in of a time
qualification on the scope of its priority. This suggestion is
reinforced by the recent amendment to the LSC, s.84. Before 1975,
the section did not confer priority over mortgages or some
encumbrances on land which have been registered under the N.S.
Registry Act. This restriction was dropped in the 1975 amendments.
However, Bank of Nova Scotia v. Middleton Motors Ltd. 96
indicates a willingness on the part of the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court to impose time restrictions on the priority of statutory trusts,
similar to the time limit implied by the courts in Homeplan, without
consideration of the underlying intent or purpose of the Act(s).
Thus, problems arising out of Homeplan may not be unique to
courts of British Columbia.
(3) Finally, s.84 is unclear about the property to which the lien
attaches. Because of the language of the section, and the reluctance
of judges to depart from accepted notions of secured financing, it
will probably be held that the lien attaches to the real and personal
property of the employer. Subsection (1) deems the Tribunal to hold
a mortgage "on the assets of the employer". Subsection (2) confers
priority over all liens, charges or mortgages "in respect of the real
and personal property of the employer". Thus, in this aspect, the
effects of s.5A and s.84 are probably the same, in that the liens are
94. Ocean Air Conditioning and Refrigeration ContractorsLtd. v. Dan et al.,
supra, note 70.
95. Note, however, that the result in Ocean Air would have been the same under
both Acts, because s. 84 excepts the claims of other workmen from its jurisdiction.
Thus, labour-and-material lienholders would still have succeeded in their claim.
An informal practice has been established between the Labour Standards Board and
the Workmen's Compensation Board, conferring priority on claims of the former
over the latter. (Interview with Gordon Gillis, Solicitor for the Department of
Labour August 27, 1979) This arrangement is practical, because claims of unpaid
employees are usually smaller than claims of competing creditors. Moreover, the
arrangement is supported by the wording at the beginning of section 84(l), LSC:
"Notwithstanding any other Act..
96. Supra, note 65
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limited to the property interests of the employer.
In sum, while a s.84-lien may be more effective in one respect,
and a s.5A-lien in others, this form of wage protection is clearly
unsatisfactory in that it is subject to the interpretative techniques and
implied policy preferences of presiding judges.
Notwithstanding all of this, two recent decisions by the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia may indicate that concerns about the
effectiveness of s.84 are groundless. This is the first time that s.84
has come before the courts of Nova Scotia.
Central and Eastern Trust Company v. George R. Saunders
Construction Co. Ltd. et al.97 involved the claim of the
plaintiff-mortgagee (for $37,849.37) competing with the Provincial
Tax Commission (for $3,110.95), the Labour Standards Tribunal
(for $640. of unpaid wages and vacation pay), the Workmen's
Compensation Board (for $3,658.08), and the Nova Scotia Power
Corporation (for $472.24). The Provincial Tax Commission
abandoned its claim for priority, so the remaining parties contested
their entitlement to portions of $42,000. realized on the sale of
mortgaged lands. With little ado, Lusby J. (a Local Judge of the
Trial Division) decided that each of the parties had a valid claim to
take in priority to the mortgagee, regardless of the fact that the
mortgage was executed and registered before any of the other claims
arose.
Three aspects of the judgment may seriously reduce its value as a
persuasive authority on s.84. First, Lusby J. failed to discuss any of
the issues raised by applying s.84, especially the time the lien arose
and the property to which it attached. He merely said,
In my opinion, the wording of s.84(2) can only be interpreted as
giving the Tribunal priority in the present instance over the
mortgagee, even although the foreclosed mortage was executed
and registered before the unregistered order of the Tribunal was
made and probably even before the employee had become
entitled to the wages and vacation pay mentioned in the order. It
legislature to enact legislation
is within the power of a provincial
98
having so drastic an effect.
This approach conflicts with that adopted in Re KRA Restaurants
and Bank ofNova Scotia v. Middleton Motors Ltd., which illustrate
the tendency of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court to read in a time
limitation to the operation of statutory secured instruments. 9 9
97. (1978), SAM No. 0379 (as yet unreported)

98. Id., at7

99. Supra, at 38
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Lusby J.'s departure from the traditional approach is the result of
a mechanical application of statutory provisions, without considering underlying competing values and societal needs. He initially
assumed that municipal taxes have overriding precedence, without
reference to a relevant statutory provision. Thereafter, he upheld the
priority of claims by unpaid employees, workmen and the Nova
Scotia Power Corporation. Although these claims require strikingly
different degrees of statutory protection, the language of their
priority-provisions is substantially the same. Therefore, it is the
Legislature which must ultimately accept the blame for overlooking
society's needs in assigning priorities, and the responsibility for
remedying these statutory inadequacies.
Second, the result of this case may have depended largely on its
particular facts. Lusby J. may have been willing to confer priority
on the s.84-lien, as well as on the Workman's Compensation Board
and the Power Corporation, because of the relatively small amounts
of their claims. They could be paid in full, leaving over $30,000.
for the mortgagee, which claimed $37,849.37 in total. Where assets
to pay a registered charge will be entirely or substantially consumed
by statutory claimants, a court may be less eager to recognize the
priority of the latter.
Third, it appears that Lusby J. combined the claims for vacation
pay and wages into a single claim for "unpaid pay" under s.84 of
the LSC. In other words, he disregarded the statutory distinction
between "pay" (s. l(n)) and "wages" (s. 1(r)), 10 0 in order to treat
both claims together as a s.84-lien. The judgment was silent about
the reasons for doing so. While this approach may be preferred for
its simplicity, it renders s.34 superfluous, except perhaps for claims
of vacation pay only. It is as yet uncertain what method the courts
will adopt in reconciling this overlap between s.84 and s.34.
Central and Eastern Trust Company lacks any analysis of the
problems posed by a s.84-lien, and reflects no depth of
understanding of the subject. However, in light of the second
Supreme Court decision on the same question, Centraland Eastern
Trust Company may be of some value as a trail blazer for wage
protection via section 84.
In Re Miss Dartmouth,10 1 the Trustee in bankruptcy applied for
directions in distributing $11,000. among competing creditors. The
100. Refer to note 4
101. (March 20, 1979) N.S.S.C. in bankruptcy, S.H. No. 22708 (as yet
unreported)

The Unpaid Employee as Creditor 181

claimants were the Federal Business Development Bank with a
registered chattel mortgage (for $66,938.49), the Workmen's
Compensation Board (for $61.30), the Crown in right of the
Province of Nova Scotia under the Health Services Tax Act (for
$502.77), the Crown in right of Canada under the CanadaPension
Act (for $60.52) and the Unemployment InsuranceAct (for $61.42),
and the Director of Labour Standards for vacation pay (in the
amount of $858.80). All the parties agreed that the claim of the
Workmen's Compensation Board had priority over the claim of the
Bank. Further, the Court assumed that the Bank's mortgage took
precedence over the Crown liens. Thus, the only issue before the
Court was the status of the claim filed by the Director of Labour
Standards. The claim was for vacation pay under section 34 of the
Labour Standards Code.
In the course of his judgment in Re Miss Dartmouth Limited,
Cowan C.J.S.C. helped to clarify the relationship between sections
34 and 84 of the Nova Scotia Code. He explained that section 84
was invoked because: "No appeal to the Labour Standards
Tribunal, established under the Code, was made by the bankrupt
and, by the terms of s. 19(5) of the Code, the Director's order is
deemed to be an order of the Tribunal." 10 2 In such a situation, the
court must consider the combined effect of sections 34 and 84,
creating both a statutory trust and lien on a wage creditor's behalf.
Cowan, C.J.S.C. cited with approval the judgment of Lusby J. in
Centraland Eastern Trust Company, conferring priority on claims
of unpaid employees regardless of date of registration. His Lordship
commented,
In my opinion, it was the intention of the Legislature, as
expressed in the sections [34 and 84], that the claim made by the
Tribunal on behalf of the employees, should rank in priority to all
liens, charges or mortgages, including those such as the chattel
mortgage held by the Bank, previously executed and registered or
filed in the appropriate office 10of3 the registrar of deeds for the
registration district in question.
Accordingly, the claims of the Workmen's Compensation Board
and the Director of Labour Standards were paid in full in priority to
those of the Business Development Bank.
The judgment of Cowan, C.J.S.C. implied that claims of wage
creditors under sections 34 and 84 extend beyond the property of the
102. Id., at 3
103. Id., at 4
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employer. Counsel for the Bank had submitted inter alia that all of
the competing claims "merely attached to the interest of the debtor
in the chattels in question", 1 0 4 but His Lordship rejected that
submission with respect to the claim filed by the Director of Labour
Standards. Unfortunately, after deciding that the statutory lien of
wage creditors takes priority over an earlier chattel mortgage, His
Lordship failed to define the property to which the lien attaches.
The value of Re Miss DartmouthLimited as a precedent in Nova
Scotia is uncertain. The judgment of Cowan, C.J.S.C. was rendered
after the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Homeplan
but before the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its judgment.
Homeplan was not mentioned in Re Miss Dartmouth Limited.10 5
Like Central and Eastern Trust Company, the decision was never
appealed to the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court.
A further similarity between Centraland Eastern Trust Company
and Re Miss DartmouthLimited lies in the relative amounts claimed
by competing creditors. As was pointed out in respect of the former
case,' 0 6 prior satisfaction of the liens of the Workmen's
Compensation Board and Director of Labour Standards did not
substantially reduce the amounts available to pay the chattel
mortgage held by the Bank. Had there been no other competing
claims, the sum of $11,000. would have satisfied approximately
16.5% of the Bank's total debt of $66,938.49. After payment in full
to the Workmen's Compensation Board and the Director of Labour
Standards, the remaining $10,079.90 satisfied approximately 15%
of the claim of the Bank - a reduction of only 1.5%.
104. Id., at 2
105. It has been suggest that the Homeplan decision does not apply to Nova
Scotia, for two reasons. First, the Torrens land titles system in effect in British
Columbia is fundamentally different from the Nova Scotia registry system. Within
the Torrens system, registration and issuance of a registrar's certificate of title
confers indefeasible title. Purchasers of land may rely absolutely on registered title.
Because of the significance of registration of a property interest in British Columbia
it would seriously disrupt the system if the courts disregarded the date of
registration in determining priorities of interests. The registry system of Nova
Scotia, on the other hand, is outdated and inefficient. It is a solicitor's certificate of
title rather than registration that guarantees clear title. This reduced reliance on
registration may allow Nova Scotia courts to distinguish Homeplan in establishing
priority of property interests. Second, as has already been pointed out, there is a
major distinction between the wording of section 5A of the Payment of Wages Act
and section F4 of the Labour Standards Code. (The above contentions were made
by Gordon Gillis, Solicitor for the Department of Labour, in an interview on
August 27, 1979.)
106. Supra, at 44
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Centraland Eastern Trust and Re Miss DartmouthLimited reveal
a surprisingly liberal interpretation of s.84 of the Labour Standards
Code. Both judgments made a radical allocation of priorities to
wage creditors over a mortgagee with a prior registered claim.
Neither judgment expressly considered its impact on the conduct of
secured commercial transactions, nor distinguished inconsistent
case law. Despite an absence of binding judicial authority, the cases
invite more effective wage protection by statutory lien in Nova
Scotia. But it is still likely that if the Appeal Division of the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court were confronted with sizeable wage claims
which would preclude payment to secured business creditors it
would consider itself bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Homeplan.
V. Recommendations
From briefly canvassing alternative methods of wage protection it
may be concluded that federal and provincial legislators have
recognized the need for protecting wage-earners and have
half-heartedly committed themselves to implementing a program to
that end. Further, it appears that most judges (with the possible
exception of those in Nova Scotia) are unwilling to assist wages
creditors at the expense of other secured creditors, unless expressly
required to do so by statute. How then can wage protection,
particularly at the provincial level, be made more effective? Three
basic approaches will be suggested: (1) tighten up statutory liens;
(2) reconcile competing statutory liens; and (3) develop a public
fund.
(1) Specific proposals for amending s.84 have been implicit in the
preceding discussion; such as making the lien retroactive to the date
the wages are earned and expressly excluding time limitations to
priority, such as that imposed by the courts in Homeplan.
Provisions modelled on other statutory liens may be adopted to
extend the priority of s.84 liens. For example, the Workmen's
Compensation Act' 0 7 creates "a first lien upon all the property,
real, personal or mixed, used in or in connection with or produced
in or by the industry with respect to which the employer is assessed
though not owned by the employer . . ." Adding a similar
provision to s.84 may effectively extend the property to which the
107. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 343, s. 144(1)
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lien attaches beyond the employer's interest in his real or personal
property.
Another model is the Assessment Act,' 0 8 ss.135 and 153 of
which create a lien for taxes on real and personal property. Any
creditor, or the sheriff, who takes possession of personal property
assessed for taxes "shall be personally liable to the municipality or
town for the amounts of the rates and taxes rated and levied against
the owner. . ." (s. 135(3)). Perhaps s.84 could make business and
consumer creditors personally liable to the extent of their security
when they attempt to realize on it prior to an employer's
bankruptcy. Such a provision would ensure payment of a greater
percentage of wage claims by acting as a disincentive to secured
creditors realizing on their security and draining the employer's
assets left over for wage claimants.
Finally, s.84 of the Labour Standards Code should provide for an
employee's right to claim interest at a current rate on unpaid wages,
as soon as the debt becomes due under the contract of employment.
There is scant authority on this point. In Eaton v. The Queen,' 0 9 an
employee claimed, inter alia, interest for delay in payment of
salary. The Eaton case must be distinguished because the claimant
was employed by the Crown in right of Canada under a collective
agreement but Kerr J.'s comments about the issue of interest are
useful. He pointed out that there are two kinds of interest: an
amount agreed to be paid on a loan, and a sum payable as damages
for non-payment of a debt.-1 0 A review of common law authorities,
as well as the FederalCourt Act,I" revealed that the Crown would
only be liable to pay interest of either kind where there was an
express statutory provision or contractual obligation.
A Nova Scotia case dealing with interest is Leisure CedarHomes
Construction Inc. v. Hranisauljewicz and Janulewicz, 112 where
interest was claimed by mechancis' lineholders. The uncertainty of
the law in this area is illustrated by a citation in the Leisure decision
from another judgment, that,
a good case can be made out that the Supreme Court has the
power to award interest to the same extent as it has in England
108. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 14, ss. 135, 153. This provision resembles the Bank Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. B-i, s. 88(5).

109. (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 723 (Fed. Ct.) (T.D.)
110. Id., at 731
111. R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp), c. 10, s. 35
112. (1976) 22 N.S.R. (2d) 372 (N.S. Co.Ct.)
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under Lord Tenterden's Act in 1833.11
McLellan, Co. Ct. J. in Leisure, indicates that interest will be
allowed where there is a contractual right to interest, or where a
specific debt is owed at a certain time by virtue of a written
agreement, or where there has been a written demand of payment
giving notice that interest will be claimed.
A more recent Nova Scotia authority on the matter of awarding
prejudgment interest is Webb Real Estate v. Mclnnis, Meehan &
Tramble et al.'- 4 This Court of Appeal decision clarifies the
authority of the court to award interest and damages in the nature of
interest. The case is not set in the context of a wage creditor's claim,
but the principles of law laid down by the court are clearly
applicable to such a case.
Coffin J.A. decided that, in addition to a common law power to
award prejudgment interest, there is express statutory authority in
the 1859 Interest Act"15 still in force in Nova Scotia, which is the
equivalent to Lord Tenterden's Act of England. Section 4 of the
Interest Act reads as follows:
4. Upon all debts or sums certain payable at a certain time, or
otherwise, the jury, and the court where there is no jury, on the
trial of any issue or inquisition of damages, may, if they shall
think fit, allow interest from the time when such debts, or sums
certain, were payable, if such debts or sums be payable by virtue
of some written instrument at a certain time, or if payable
otherwise, then from the time when demand of payment shall
have been made in writing, such demand giving notice to the
debtor that interest will be claimed from the date thereof.
Webb Real Estate serves to reinforce the opinion of the court in
Leisure. As a result, it is open to an unpaid employee to claim
interest by any of the methods mentioned by McLellan Co. Ct. J.,
depending on his specific contract of employment. Thus, statutory
provision for interest in the Labour Standards Code would not
derogate from the common law, or from statutory law and judges
may be willing to enforce it. Such an amendment would encourage
prompt payment of wages, and would harness time as a weapon
working in the employee's favour.
(2) It seems that whenever the Legislature has recognized the
113. Sydney Rotary DrillingServices Ltd. v. Quebec Assurance Company (1975),
16 N.S.R. (2d) 233 (N.S.S.C.) (T.D.), cited by McLellan, Co.Ct. J., at 373.
114. (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 6 (N.S.C.A.)
115. R.S.N.S. 1859 (Second Series), Ch. 82
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importance of meeting the claims of a particular class of creditor, it
has blindly tacked a priority provision onto a statutory lien. It has
failed to reconcile priority of claims with the needs of the
community and to come to terms with its own relative values.
Provincial legislation must clearly delineate an order of priorities
among statutory security interests. To draft such legislation it will
be necessary to set out and evaluate competing interests and define
government policy objectives in relation to secured transactions,
wage protection and Crown claims of statutory priority for various
provincial and municipal taxes.
Constitutional difficulties may arise in the event of a bankrupt
debtor, with conflict between provincial statutes and the order of
distribution specified under the Bankruptcy Act. Further constitutional questions will be posed in situations of competing claimants
under federal statutory trusts such as those created by the Canada
Pension Plan and the Unemployment InsuranceAct, and provincial
statutory trusts. Federal and provincial co-operation in rationalizing
priorities among statutory security interests, both before and during
situations of bankruptcy, is a desirable goal, however unlikely it is
to be achieved in the near future. In the meantime, provincial
delineation of priorities is essential to an effective system of wage
protection by statutory security interests.
(3) The most secure method of wage protection would be a public
fund, guaranteeing immediate payment of a set maximum of unpaid
wages. This is not a new concept. Extensive bonding programs,
such as in Alberta, 1 16 may be seen as a form of wage insurance. If
the program was extended beyond designated industries to
encompass all employers, and if there was no allowance for
exemptions for good past performance in wage payment, then a
general compulsory insurance scheme would have been developed
from the existing bonding system.
In December, 1975, the Senate Banking, Trade and Commerce
Committee recommended that a government-administered fund be
created by contributions from employers and employees. Upon
bankruptcy, employees would receive unpaid wages to a limit of
$2,000, excluding vacation pay, severance pay and fringe
benefits. 117
Comparison to insurance schemes in other countries points out
the disadvantages of the Senate Committee proposal for unpaid
116. Supra, at75
117. Can. Sen. Deb., Thursday, December 11, 1975.
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employees. In Israel, under the National Social Insurance Act,
workers' wages are guaranteed in the event of bankruptcy.
However, only employers are responsible for funding the scheme.
The ceiling of payments from the fund is annually adjusted to
correspond to changes in the average wage. 11 8 Japan has
implemented a scheme very similar to that in Israel, guaranteeing
wage payments, severance pay, and interest at a specified rate. tt9' In
Germany, the wage insurance plan repays salary, vacation pay,
overtime, and "special benefits for dangerous and arduous
20
work". 1

In comparison to these national insurance schemes, the Senate
proposal seems harsh and unreasonable in requiring employees to
contribute to a fund ensuring wage payment. Wages are an
employer's debt, owed in consideration for an employee's
continuing services. An employee should not be expected to relieve
the employer of a share of his contractual liability to pay wages, nor
to guarantee its performance. Furthermore, it is arbitrary to exclude
vacation pay, severance pay and fringe benefits from wages
recoverable from the fund. All forms of payment are contractual
debts owed by the employer. If the purpose of the exclusion is to
limit the quantum of wage claims, such is already achieved by
setting a $2,000. ceiling on recovery. Thus, the exclusion is
unreasonable and redundant.
Effective wage protection may be guaranteed by a provincial
insurance scheme, operating not only upon an employer's
bankruptcy, but also upon insolvency, as well as in the event of the
employer's unwillingness to pay. This scheme could be administered by the provincial Department of Labour in conjunction with
officers under the Labour Standards Code. Funding would be
provided by each employer contributing a pre-determined percentage of the salaries earned by its employees. After a preliminary
investigation of complaints made to the Director, employees with
valid complaints would be paid forthwith, up to a maximum set by
regulations) for example, three months and a figure annually
adjusted). In order to reimburse the fund, the Labour Standards
Tribunal would be automatically subrogated into the employees'
rights against the employer, and would claim the full amount of
wages owing. If the Tribunal recovered more than the amount
118. I.L.O. Socialand LabourBulletin, 1975, No. 2, at 150-151
119. I.L.O. SocialandLabourBulletin, 1976, No. 2, at 134
120. I.L.O. Socialand LabourBulletin, 1974, No. 2, at 53-54
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initially paid by the fund to the employee, that balance would go to
the employee, who would thereby have the potential to be fully
compensated.
Development of public wage insurance would cause minimal, if
any, disruption to the existing system of commercial transactions.
That is, it could operate effectively to guarantee wage payments to
unpaid employees, despite the Legislature's failure to enhance the
priority of wage creditors over that of secured creditors. However,
the process of subrogation to reimburse the public fund would be
less successful if the rights of wage creditors were not upgraded
through amendments to the section 84 lien.
The cost of administering such a scheme would probably not be
very high. Because the resources in the fund itself would come from
employer contributions, the provincial government need only pay
pure costs of administration, such as hiring people to receive and
deposit contributions into the fund, and make payments to deserving
complainants. There is an exisiting framework of staff working
within the Labour Standards Branch, which could investigate
complaints (as it already does) and enforce the employees'
subrogated rights to reimburse the public fund, although this staff
would have to be increased if there were a greater volume of
complaints after putting the insurance scheme into effect.
Whether or not such a scheme is established is essentially a
question of the economic priorities of the provincial government.
The fact that few complaints are presently made to the Director of
Labour Standards in relation to the number of incidents of
non-payment of wages and the inadequacy of existing remedies for
wage-creditors indicate that a public fund is vital to an effective
program of wage protection. Surely a society which has accepted
the concept of unemployment insurance should realize the social
and economic importance of "employment" insurance. 121
No single wage-collection remedy is sufficient in itself because of
the infinite variety of circumstances in which non-payment of wages
occurs. However, the present patchwork of wage protection in Nova
Scotia is unsatisfactory, not only because of large gaps in available
remedies, but also because the alternative remedies are hidden
among widespread statutes. The average employee, not to mention
the average lawyer, has difficulty discovering the rights of a wage
creditor and how to enforce them. As a start, therefore, the various
121. Interview with Professor B. Cotter, February 14, 1979.
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remedies now available and future improvements upon them,
should be systeminatically integrated in a single statute.
Until the Nova Scotia government implements similar recommendations to those discussed herein, or somehow drastically
revises its present "program" of wage recovery, wage protection
will continue to be one of the most contentious issues in the field of
employment law.
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